Drop
Dev tools
sandboxing
SHOW HN2026
193points
63comments
#308of 4,366 in 2026
Top 8%of 2026 by points
How HN took it
CuriousMostly questions and neutral comments
6 positive, 17 neutral or asking, 2 mixed, 4 critical, out of 29 comments about the project. Thread score +0.12.
Idea: 4 for, 3 againstDocs: 1 for, 0 againstPerformance: 0 for, 1 against
The thread, comment by comment
Each row is a top-level comment and its replies, in HN's order. Select a cell to open that comment on HN.
positive neutral or mixed critical about another commenter or something else the maker
What HN said
What people liked
Well-thought-out approach that fits virtualenv-like workflow
From 3 comments
As everyone mention, there are a lot of implementations of this idea, and not only for agent workflows. My own approach has the following features, hopefully that gets stolen…
XJ6w9dTdM on HNThis is exactly what I was looking for - the website and docs are easy on the brain. I have some apps hosted on distrobox containers that I'd rather not have write access to my…
pavinjoseph on HNThank you for building it! I started using Drop a few weeks ago, and I've been very happy with it so far (thanks again for quickly fixing a few issues I've reported :)!). For me,…
p2004a on HN
Objections
Overlaps with existing tools like bubblewrap, runc, and gVisor usage
From 3 comments
I've been using gVisor with Docker (or Docker-compatible runtimes) via runsc for years. It isn't obvious to me what this does that we haven't been able to do for some time now.
xyzzy_plugh on HNHow is this different than bwrap or srt and others? Im using bwrap to achieve read only everywhere and and write on pwd. Also pi and other coding agents all have sandboxing that…
messh on HNHi OP, funny enough I’m working on something very similar. Lots of us are I guess! Take that as validation of your thinking. I like that your readme has a couple paragraphs…
refibrillator on HN
Linux-only, does not work on macOS
From 1 comment
So this seems to be useful to me, when you run drop run it starts a child process and places it into a Linux namespace...it gives the process a separate identity and limited…
orliesaurus on HN
Does not work inside containers or support nested containers
From 1 comment
Unfortunately not, and it also does not support starting containers from the sandbox.
mixedbit on HN
Requests
GUI application sandboxing
From 2 comments
Thank you for building it! I started using Drop a few weeks ago, and I've been very happy with it so far (thanks again for quickly fixing a few issues I've reported :)!). For me,…
p2004a on HNThanks! I have GUI applications sandboxing on the roadmap. I also ponder the idea to add VM as the third runtime option (in addition to currently supported native Linux…
mixedbit on HN
Support for containerized apps like docker compose
From 1 comment
Thank you for building it! I started using Drop a few weeks ago, and I've been very happy with it so far (thanks again for quickly fixing a few issues I've reported :)!). For me,…
p2004a on HN
Questions
How does it differ from bubblewrap and other sandboxes
From 2 comments
How is this different than bwrap or srt and others? Im using bwrap to achieve read only everywhere and and write on pwd. Also pi and other coding agents all have sandboxing that…
messh on HNSo, the primary advantage of this over bubblewrap is the insulation layer between the program and kernel syscalls?
JoshTriplett on HN
Performance overhead of gVisor
From 2 comments
This is a really interesting middle ground between venvs and containers. How much overhead does gVisor add in practice for typical local development workloads?
adityamishra241 on HNThat sounds like a huge hit to performance
tty456 on HN
Threat model: credentials inside sandbox
From 2 comments
Worth being explicit about the threat model, because it decides the design. Isolating against a compromised dependency needs filesystem and egress control. Isolating against your…
joserobles84 on HNThere are a lot of options in this space, but I feel utterly helpless. Which of these are really secure such that I could intentionally run malware without fear of my ssh keys…
0cf8612b2e1e on HN
Alternatives named
bubblewrap
From 2 comments
This is super interesting to me. I've slowly been working on something similar (https://gitlab.com/saghm/tartarus) because my ideal sandboxing is "prevent writing to anything…
saghm on HNHow is this different than bwrap or srt and others? Im using bwrap to achieve read only everywhere and and write on pwd. Also pi and other coding agents all have sandboxing that…
messh on HN
Podman or LXC containers
From 2 comments
Can you explain a bit more about the boundary between the environment and my system? Is it just giving read-only access to /usr/lib? I use an alias to launch a Podman container…
zenoprax on HNHello, cool project! Can you explain to me what the benefit of using this is versus something like an LXC container? It is currently my preferred "temp dev env" that behaves like…
Hasz on HN
nsjail, runc, crun
From 1 comment
Hi OP, funny enough I’m working on something very similar. Lots of us are I guess! Take that as validation of your thinking. I like that your readme has a couple paragraphs…
refibrillator on HN
Firecracker microVM
From 1 comment
I like to use firecracmer, since it has no support for many things, eg host filesystem mounting in the guest. Can you make any similar guarantees about Drop?
srcreigh on HN
litterbox
From 1 comment
Thank you for building it! I started using Drop a few weeks ago, and I've been very happy with it so far (thanks again for quickly fixing a few issues I've reported :)!). For me,…
p2004a on HN